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Population aging is emerging as a major demographic trend in many countries, with potentially 
important implications for a variety of macroeconomic issues. Notwithstanding these challenges, 
population aging will likely have a comparatively modest effect on economic growth. Although 
the changed age distribution would be expected to cause the labor force participation rate to 
decrease, the ratio of labor force to population will actually increase in most countries. This will 
occur because the lower youth dependency rate and the increased rate of female labor force 
participation – both of which may reasonably be expected to follow from the fertility rate 
declines that are driving population aging – will counterbalance the shifting of adults toward 
older ages at which labor force participation and savings rates are lower. Behavioral and policy 
responses to population aging – including higher savings for retirement, a higher rate of human 
capital accumulation, alternate pension funding plans, and (possibly) increased migration from 
labor-abundant to labor-scarce countries – also suggest that population aging need not 
necessarily significantly impede economic growth.The Graying of Global Population and Its Macroeconomic Consequences 
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Population aging is emerging as a major demographic trend in many countries, with 
potentially important economic implications.  The share of the population aged 60 and over is 
expected to increase dramatically in every country in the world between 2000 and 2050.  There 
has been a good deal of public dialogue on the topic of population aging and its economic 
effects, and much of it is highly alarmist.  For example, Peter Peterson, the former CEO of 
Lehman Brothers, Secretary of Commerce, and Chairman of the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank, described global aging as a “threat more grave and certain than those posed by chemical 
weapons, nuclear proliferation, or ethnic strife” (Peterson, 1999).  Peterson’s concern, as well as 
that of others, is that many countries are about to be flooded with a wave of elderly individuals.  
This large group of elderly persons is expected to consume substantially more than it contributes 
and to thereby alter the income trajectories that people and nations have come to expect. 
 
  This article examines the nature and magnitude of these population forecasts and reviews 
evidence on the effects of population aging on national economic performance.  Although 
population aging is certainly occurring and will have potentially profound implications for a 
variety of macroeconomic issues, we argue that it will likely have a relatively modest effect on 
economic growth due to concurrent declines in youth dependency and increases in female labor 
force participation and human capital accumulation. Behavioral and policy responses to 
population aging – including higher savings for retirement, alternate pension funding plans, and 
(possibly) increased migration from labor-abundant to labor-scarce countries – also suggest that 
population aging will not significantly impede economic growth. 
 
1. Global Population Aging 
 
Figure 1 shows the trend in the global population of people aged 60 and over.
2  In 2009, 
680 million people worldwide were in this age group, representing 11 percent of world 
population, a fraction that is not very different from the 8 percent this age group represented in 
1950.  However, current population projections suggest that there will be a sharp acceleration in 
the number and share of the elderly.  According to the latest estimates, the population aged 60 
and older will increase from 680 million to 2 billion by 2050; over the same time the share of 
people over 60 will increase from 11 to 22 percent. While the world population is projected to be 
3.6 times as large in 2050 as it was in 1950, the number of these who are 60 and over is expected 
to increase by a factor of 10, and those 80 and over will increase by a factor of 27 (UN, 2009). 
 
                                                 
2 The figures in this paper cover the time frame 1950–2050. Therefore, some of the underlying data reflect past 
trends and others are projections. Projections involve assumptions about future fertility and mortality, around which 
there is considerable uncertainty that these figures do not reflect.   Figure 1 
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Source data: United Nations, 2009 
 
Of course, these global averages mask considerable heterogeneity both across and within 
regions.  Figure 2 highlights this heterogeneity across regions, showing the share of the 
population aged over 60 in different regions.  At present this share ranges quite widely, from 5 
percent in Africa to 22 percent in Europe.  By contrast, there is much less heterogeneity with 
respect to the time trends.  Population aging will take place in all regions in the coming decades 
as the 5–22 percent range today is projected to become an 11–34 percent range in 2050 (UN, 
2009).  
 
  2Figure 2 
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Source data: United Nations, 2009 
 
There is also considerable heterogeneity within regions.  For example, Scotland's 
population is aging much more rapidly than the population in most other parts of the United 
Kingdom or Europe as a result of consistent out-migration of working-age adults, low levels of 
fertility, and increasing longevity (Hollywood, Brown, Danson, and McQuaid, 2007; Lisenkova, 
Mosca, and Wright, 2008). 
 
Table 1 shows the ten countries with the highest shares of people aged 60 and over in 
2005 and those projected to have the highest shares in 2050.  Japan currently has the largest old-
age share in the world, with 27 percent of the population aged 60 and over.  By 2050, the UN 
projects that this figure will rise to 44 percent.  Japan’s trajectory, however is not unique; by 
2050, more than 70 countries, representing about one third of the global population, are expected 
to have an old-age share exceeding Japan’s share of 27 percent today. It therefore seems clear 
that much of the world is heading into uncharted waters with respect to population aging.   
  3Table 1 
Countries with the Highest 60-and-over Population Shares, 2005 and 2050 
 
2005    2050 
 %      % 
Japan 27  Japan  44 
Italy  25  Republic of Korea  41 
Germany 25  Singapore  40 
Sweden 23  Germany  40 
Greece  23  Bosnia and Herzegovina  39 
Bulgaria 23  Italy  39 
Latvia 22  Cuba  39 
Portugal 22  Portugal  38 
Belgium 22  Bulgaria  38 
Austria 22  Poland  38 
 
Source data: United Nations, 2009 
Note: Figures for 2050 exclude Hong Kong, Macau, and countries with population less than 
250,000. 
 
The phenomenon of population aging is not limited to wealthy industrial countries such 
as Japan, South Korea, and Spain, but also affects the two largest developing countries, India and 
China. As Figure 3 shows, people in their 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s will comprise 20 percent of 
India’s population and 30 percent of China’s by 2050 – adding up to over three-fourths of a 
billion people, more than the total 60-and-over population of the world today.  The high old-age 
share will have significant implications for government finances, the need for and delivery of 
health care, and economic security of the elderly. 
 
  4Figure 3 































Source data: United Nations, 2009 
 
2. Why Population is Aging 
 
Demographers focus on three main drivers of population aging: age dynamics, fertility 
decline, and longevity increase.  Age dynamics refers mainly to past variations in birth and death 
rates and how these play out in the evolution of a country’s age structure.  A good example of 
this is the baby boom in the United States, which took place between 1946 and 1964, and led to 
very large cohorts that are now swelling the ranks of the 60-and-over population.  
  
The second major reason for rising old-age-shares is declining fertility rates.  This 
phenomenon, which has taken place, or is still taking place, in most countries in the world, 
means that the share of older people will automatically increase, other things equal.  Figure 4 
plots actual and projected fertility rates (the average number of children born to a woman over 
her lifetime) over time. In general, 2.1 children per woman is considered to be the long-term 
replacement fertility rate for developed countries.  The total world fertility rate fell quite sharply 
from about 5 children per woman in 1950 to a little over 2.5 in 2008.  It is projected to drop 
further, to about 2, by 2050 (United Nations, 2009).  This decrease is largely attributable to 
changes in fertility in the developing world and can be ascribed to a number of factors, including 
declines in infant mortality, greater levels of female education, increased labor market 
opportunities for women, and the provision of family planning services (Bloom, Canning, Fink, 
and Finlay, 2009; Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998; Tyers and Shi, 2007). 
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Source data: United Nations, 2009 
 
Figure 4 highlights the extent of demographic differences in the world.  Among countries 
classified as developed in 2008, fertility rates have fallen to below the long-run replacement 
level. Several countries have dropped even below 1.5 children per woman. Current fertility rates 
are 1.2 in South Korea, 1.3 in both Singapore and Japan, and between 1.2 and 1.4 in a number of 
countries in Eastern Europe.  
 
Rising life expectancy is the last of the three main reasons why the share of the elderly in 
the population is increasing.  Over the last five decades, life expectancy increased by twenty 
years from 46 years in 1950–55 to 66 years in 2000–05. Global life expectancy is projected by 
the UN (2009) to rise by another decade over the next half century to 76 years.  
 
A large group of researchers is investigating human lifespan today, and there appears to 
be a general agreement that the increases in life expectancy will continue. However, substantial 
disagreement prevails regarding the magnitude of these future changes. One school of thought – 
associated mainly with the work of James Vaupel (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002; Vaupel and 
Gowan, 1986) – holds that life expectancy will reach 100 years in the latter half of this century in 
several of the wealthy industrial countries. An opposing school of thought contends that life 
expectancy will increase by only .5 years per decade and is not likely to exceed 85 in the 
medium to long term.  For example, Fries (1980) and Carnes, Olshansky, and Grahn (2003) 
argue that the age ceiling is fixed so that old-age mortality is largely unchangeable. A third 
school of thought – associated with the work of Ronald Lee (2003) and John Bongaarts (2006) – 
contends that life expectancy will increase about 1.5 years per decade, with no ceiling.  
 
  6An important related question is whether the increases in lifespan will be accompanied by 
general increases in old-age well-being and productivity. If the average age at death is 
postponed, but not the general physical and mental decay of the average person, increases in life 
expectancy add little value from the perspective of an individual, and may further aggravate the 
burden on the health care system. On the other hand, if advances in medicine postpone not only 
death, but also the onset of chronic disease, the potential increases in individual and aggregate 
welfare are large. This phenomenon, known as the “compression of morbidity,” means that the 
years people spend ill are compressed into a smaller part of the life cycle. Although there is not 
yet agreement, most of the evidence does suggest that morbid years have in fact been 
compressed over the last decades (Fries, 1980, 1989; Crimmins, 2004; Crimmins, Saito, and 
Ingegneri, 1997; Costa, 2002).  
 
3. Population Aging and Economic Performance 
 
One question that naturally emerges from the large observed shifts in age structure 
concerns the effects of population aging on nations’ economic performance.  Many studies, such 
as the Peterson analysis mentioned in the introduction, suggest that population aging will 
diminish the productive capacities of nations. In general, these studies highlight the importance 
of labor and capital to the production of output and the creation of value.  Their central 
contention is that there are strong life-cycle patterns related to work and saving. Since senior 
citizens do not work and save as much as younger adults, these studies predict that population 
aging will have a large negative effect on economic growth.  
 
Although the logic of this argument is sound, the narrow scope chosen in this type of 
study causes them to overstate the magnitude of the economic burden associated with population 
aging. This is so for two reasons: first, the exclusive focus on the elderly completely neglects 
other important differences in the age structure that are highly relevant for economic growth and  
development. Second, most existing studies assume individuals’ behavior to be constant and thus 
fail to consider a host of behavioral and policy adjustments that will naturally occur in response 
to population aging.  Taking account of these two points leads to a significantly more positive 
economic outlook for an aging world. 
 
One key factor for economic growth is the relative and absolute size of the labor force. 
The global labor force participation rate (i.e., the total labor force divided by the population aged 
15 and over) is projected to fall 4.3 percentage points from 2000 to 2040, from 66.4 to 62.1.
3 
Some scholars find this predicted change alarming.  However, from a broader perspective, this 
decline represents less than half of a standard deviation in the cross-country distribution of the 
labor force participation rate for 2000.  Moreover, a second accounting indicator provides a very 
different picture.  The size of the labor force, when expressed as a ratio to total population 
(instead of to the population aged 15 and over), will actually increase, from 46.5 percent to 48.6 
percent (Bloom, Canning, and Fink 2009).  This change is due to falling fertility in developing 
countries.  In other words, the increase in elderly dependents will be more than offset by a 
decline in youth dependents.  This offset suggests that population aging does not pose an 
                                                 
3 Data for past labor force participation are from International Labour Organization, 2007. Projections are based on 
United Nations medium-fertility population projection and age- and gender- specific participation rates in 2000. 
  7imminent economic crisis for the world.  It is more accurately viewed as, at most, a modest issue 
for particular economies (such as the OECD).  
 
This basic point – that despite an increasingly elderly population, the labor force is likely 
to be a larger share of the total population – is one reason to not be too pessimistic about the 
effects of population aging. 
 
Behavioral change and institutional adaptation are two more reasons for viewing 
population aging as a manageable phenomenon from an economic perspective. Aging 
populations generally are associated with increased labor force participation of women, increased 
human capital accumulation among the young, and increased savings.  These behavioral 
responses may be even stronger when supported by childcare, retirement, and immigration 
policies that allow for desirable adjustments in the labor market.  
 
Declining fertility has led to, and will continue to lead to, greater female labor force 
participation.  Bloom and colleagues analyze data for 97 countries during 1960 to 2000 and show 
that for every unit reduction in fertility, women tend to work two years more over their lives 
(Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay, 2009).
 4 Based on UN fertility assumptions for 2040, this 
translates into a 3 percentage point boost in the female labor force participation rate. 
 
Second, fewer children generally mean healthier, smarter, and better-educated children as 
parents divide their resources among fewer offspring. Insofar as health, cognition, and education 
translate into higher adult productivity, lower fertility rates thus induce a further boost to 
economic growth (Bloom and Canning, 2000). 
 
Third, demographic projections indicate further gains in longevity, as discussed above, 
including most probably gains in years of healthy life.  In addition to the increases in private 
welfare, increased longevity is also expected to provide a boost to savings rates as people 
accumulate more capital in expectation of longer future periods of retirement (Bloom, Canning, 
and Graham, 2003).  In economic terms, savings translates into investment, which in turn fuels 
the accumulation of physical and human capital and technological progress, which drive 
economic growth. 
 
Fourth, it appears natural for people to respond to longer lifespans by planning on longer 
working lives (Bloom, Canning, Mansfield, and Moore, 2007; Kulish, Smith, and Kent, 2006). 
This notion, however, has not been reflected in public policy. Social security systems in many 
countries offer strong incentives for retirement between the ages of 60 and 65 (Gruber and Wise, 
1998; Burtless and Moffitt, 1984). In addition, Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay (2009) have 
shown that life expectancy has increased substantially more than the mean legal retirement age in 
a large cross-section of countries since 1960. Taking advantage of the willingness of older 
people to work for more years will require reforming this aspect of social security systems.  
Tight labor markets of the future – expected as a result of smaller cohorts entering the labor 
market – will provide strong impetus for such reforms if employers want to keep or increase the 
absolute size of their labor force in the long run.  Increases in the legal retirement age are 
                                                 
4 Causality inferences are reasonably strong here as these studies rely on the timing of changes in abortion laws as a 
plausibly exogenous and valid instrument for fertility.  
  8probably not imminent as long as global unemployment remains high, but such increases may 
well follow on the heels of any global recovery. 
 
Developed and developing countries will have to adopt different approaches to 
addressing age-related issues if they want to provide economic security of the elderly. Rich 
countries have effective institutional structures for transferring resources between income groups 
and between generations; pension systems are consequently much easier to design and 
implement.  Poor countries lack both the private savings for funded pension schemes and the 
institutional base for pay-as-you-go schemes, and are forced to rely more heavily on traditional 
family networks and continued employment by the elderly.  These family structures are breaking 
down because of fertility decline, spatial mobility of young people, and increasing female 
employment (Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay, 2009). Although wealthy industrial countries 
certainly face a greater and more imminent challenge in terms of their elderly populations, those 
countries also possess much greater resources to address the issue. 
 
International migration policies also have the potential to ameliorate the economic effects 
of population aging by allowing some of the young workers in labor-abundant developing 
countries to move to the more rapidly aging developed world. Cross-country disparities in 
income and demographics will likely increase the pressure for migration substantially.  Rodrik 
(2002) argues that allowing greater migration has far more potential to promote global income 
growth than does further liberalization of trade and capital mobility. Similarly, recent analysis in 
Scotland and Ireland concluded that positive net migration is the only likely future source of 
labor increase in these countries (Lisenkova, Mosca, and Wright, 2008).  Encouragingly, since 
2004 Scotland has seen increased in-migration, mostly from the European Union’s newest 
members.  Some countries see ever greater potential for the positive effects of immigration. The 
UK Financial Services Authority chair Adair Turner (2006) classified the UK’s pensions system 
as manageable and even sustainable, based on the key measure of “combined population 
replacement rate,” i.e., the total fertility rate plus the permanent net immigration rate.  In the UK, 
the combined rate of fertility plus immigration was 2.1 in 2006 – exactly the rate for long-term 
population replacement and pension system sustainability. However, substantial institutional 
barriers to immigration are likely to persist, with high unemployment and social tension 
undermining political support for migration reform. 
 
Independent of the actual magnitudes of future migration flows, all the evidence 
presented and discussed in this paper suggests that there is no reason to believe that aging will 
become a major burden for economic growth in the foreseeable future. Without any doubt aging 
societies pose a major challenge to the design and implementation of government programs in 
general, and health and social security in particular; significant policy efforts and reform will be 
required to ensure the long-term sustainability of these programs. However, from a purely 
economic perspective, the graying of societies is not a bad thing per se. As long as the private 
and public sector are flexible enough to adjust to the newly emerging societal structures, aging is 
unlikely to have much effect on economic growth.   
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